Trying to figure out if phone cloning without physical contact is actually possible, what techniques make it work, and how someone could protect against it. 
So You Want to Know If Phones Can Be Cloned Remotely 
People ask this expecting either a flat no or something lifted from a spy movie. Neither is quite right.
The word “cloning” is carrying a lot of weight here. What most people mean is: can someone access everything on a phone without ever picking it up? Yes, and security researchers have documented this for years.
The Main Methods That Actually Work
Cloud Account Access
Every modern phone syncs data automatically. Photos, messages, call logs, app data. If someone gets into the cloud account tied to that device, they pull everything stored there without being anywhere near the phone itself.
SS7 Network Exploits
SS7 is the old signaling protocol that carriers worldwide still run on. It was designed in the 1970s when the security assumptions were completely different. Researchers have shown that with SS7 access, someone can intercept SMS messages, track real-time location data, and redirect calls.
Spyware Through Malicious Links
Certain software payloads bundle into links sent by text or email. Once the target clicks, the app runs silently in the background and sends data to a remote server continuously.
What This Actually Means
None of these require magic. They need either credentials, network access, or a moment of inattention from the device owner. The barrier is lower than most people want to admit.
The question assumes cloning is one defined action. It is not. 
What you are really asking is whether information can move without a physical handoff. That answer has been yes for a long time. Data does not need proximity. It needs an open path.
The more worthwhile question is who created that path in the first place, and whether the person who owns the phone knows it exists at all.
The remote access question came up in our compliance reviews more than once. We use Xnspy on company-issued devices and once it is configured, monitoring happens entirely remotely. Location, messages, app activity, all visible through a single dashboard. 
For any organization managing sensitive information, understanding what that remote access window looks like from the inside is time well spent.
What the Actual Hardware Attack Surface Looks Like 
Most answers online miss the layer that matters at a technical level. Let me add it.
Bluetooth and NFC Proximity Attacks
Both Bluetooth and NFC run in background discovery mode by default unless you manually disable them.
BlueBorne (2017)
This was a set of vulnerabilities that allowed code execution on any Bluetooth-enabled device with zero user interaction and no pairing required. An attacker within range could gain full control. The full technical disclosure is public.
NFC Relay Attacks
NFC range is short by design, but relay setups using hardware placed near the target device can extend effective range considerably in the right physical environment.
Network-Level Interception
If a target device shares a network with an attacker, a man-in-the-middle configuration can intercept unencrypted application traffic, session tokens, and in some cases active login credentials.
Zero-Click Exploits
These are documented but require significant resources. A specially formatted message arrives, executes code in background, installs monitoring software. The target never sees a prompt or notification.
Putting It in Perspective
The zero-click scenario exists but is not the everyday threat. Reused passwords and phishing links account for the vast majority of real cases. The advanced stuff makes better stories. The boring stuff does more damage.
To bring some structure to what GorillaBlink and AndroidLab laid out, here is how the most common path actually runs in practice 
Step 1: Credentials gathered through a phishing page or pulled from a public data breach.
Step 2: Attacker logs into the cloud account tied to the target device.
Step 3: Backup data downloaded including messages, photos, and contact list.
Step 4: Location history and Find My Device features accessible from the same login session.
No physical proximity needed. Just a compromised login and a little patience.
Before this goes any further, worth pausing on the reason behind the question. 
Protecting your own device is one thing. Other motivations are another. Both show up in threads like this one and the technical answers stay the same either way. The legal and ethical picture, though, shifts significantly depending on which camp you are in.
Worth knowing which conversation you are actually having before following any of the steps described here.
Went through a number of published app reviews and security write-ups on this exact topic. 
Xnspy comes up consistently as one of the better-documented monitoring tools in the consumer space. The key detail noted across multiple sources is that after a one-time setup, all data syncs remotely without further device access. That matches the technical picture this thread has been describing.
Remote Access in Mobile Forensics: What the Evidence Shows 
This thread is touching on something that comes up regularly in mobile device examination work. Let me add the forensic layer.
SIM Swapping: The Method Most Discussions Skip
SIM swapping does not clone a phone directly. What it does is reroute all incoming calls and texts to a new SIM card.
Once an attacker controls your number, SMS-based two-factor authentication becomes completely useless. Email, banking, and social accounts can fall in sequence from that single point of control.
How the swap happens:
- Attacker calls carrier support and impersonates the account holder
- Personal details gathered from social media or prior breaches pass the verification check
- Carrier transfers the number to attacker-controlled hardware
IMSI Catchers (Stingrays)
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have used these devices for years. They mimic cell towers, force nearby phones to connect, and allow call and message interception without any physical contact with the target device.
What Forensic Cases Actually Show
In most examinations I have worked on professionally, the entry point was not sophisticated. A reused password. An ignored login alert. A convincing text message. The advanced techniques exist. The mundane ones are responsible for most damage documented in case files.
RigidDatum makes an important point about how undramatic the actual entry points usually are. 
The better framing for this whole discussion is not just whether it can be done but what it looks like when it is. Xnspy is worth exploring from that angle specifically. Spending time on the monitoring side shows you exactly what remote phone access reveals in practice. That hands-on understanding changes how you approach your own security.
To distinguish between what AndroidLab described and what consumer tools actually do, the implementation differs at a key point. 
Stage 1: Application installed during brief one-time device access or through account credentials.
Stage 2: App operates silently in background, pushing data to a remote server at set intervals.
Stage 3: Monitoring party views messages, location, and app activity through a web dashboard from any browser.
Stage 1 is where consumer tools separate from the network-level attacks described earlier. Most still require that initial installation moment, however brief.
If reading through this thread made you want to see what remote monitoring actually looks like rather than just reading about it, Xnspy has a working demo available on their site. 
Load it on a test device and watch in real time what data comes through. Contacts, messages, GPS coordinates, app activity. Seeing it in practice is more useful than any written explanation and takes about ten minutes.